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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54(b), Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(a) and Utah Code Annotated § 78-
2a-3(2)G). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This appeal presents two issues for review on appeal before this Court: 
1. Whether the trial court properly found that there was no genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether Butterfield Ford could be liable to the Plaintiff for damages 
under Plaintiffs claims for negligence, strict products liability or breach of warranty. 
2. Whether a distributor of an allegedly defective product can be held strictly 
liable for harm caused by the product under the Utah Liability Reform Act where the 
distributor did not participate in the design, manufacture or testing of the product or 
prepare any labeling or warnings on the product, and where these duties have been 
expressly assumed by the manufacturer who is a named and participating defendant in the 
action. 
As stated correctly by Appellant, in reviewing a trial court's decision to grant 
summary judgment, the appellate court "need review only whether the trial court erred in 
applying the relevant law and whether a material fact was in dispute." WebBank v. 
American Gen. Annuity Serv. Corp., 2002 UT 88, f 10, 54 P.3d 1139. The trial court's 
legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness and are accorded no deference. See id. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES THAT ARE 
DETERMINATIVE OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The following are determinative of the above issues on appeal: 
1. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c); 
2. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-27-37(2), -38(3), -39(1) and -40. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case is a products liability case in which the Plaintiff, Barry Sanns, alleges 
that injuries he sustained as a passenger in a rollover automobile accident were caused by 
certain design defects in the vehicle. [R. 1-7.] The vehicle at issue is a 1999 Ford 
Econoline E-350 Super Club Wagon (the "Van") which was sold by Butterfield Ford to 
Plaintiffs former employer, the Utah Department of Corrections. [R. 44.] Plaintiff sued 
both Butterfield Ford and Ford Motor Company under theories of strict products liability, 
negligence and breach of warranty. [R. 1-7.] 
B. Course of Proceedings Below 
On or about September 9, 2002, Appellee Butterfield Ford filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment (the "Motion"), together with a memorandum in support of the 
Motion and an Affidavit from Brent E. Butterfield (the "Butterfield Affidavit"). [R. 30-
45.] In the Butterfield Affidavit, Butterfield Ford demonstrated that (i) it did not 
participate in the design, manufacture, engineering, testing or assembly of the Van, (ii) it 
did not prepare any warnings, labeling or instructions associated with the Van, and (iii) 
other than a simple pre-delivery inspection of the Van, it never performed any services or 
repairs on the Van. [R. 44.] Through the Motion, Butterfield Ford sought dismissal of 
Plaintiffs claims against it, alleging that there are no facts which would support a finding 
of any liability against it under the Utah Liability Reform Act. [R. 33-41.] Butterfield 
Ford also sought dismissal of the claims against it on the grounds that it was fraudulently 
joined in the action for the sole purpose of destroying diversity jurisdiction and 
preventing Ford Motor Company from removing the case to federal court. [R. 40-41.] 
In response to the Motion, Plaintiff alleged, among other things, that he needed 
additional time to conduct discovery "to test the factual assertions in [the Butterfield 
Affidavit] and to discover what exactly Butterfield Ford knew about this make and model 
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of vans, about their propensity to roll over and about this van in particular and to 
discovery exactly what Butterfield Ford did with respect to the van." [R. 76.] The trial 
court heard oral argument on the Motion on December 13, 2002. [R. 112.] On January 
8, 2003, the trial court granted the Plaintiff 240 days to conduct additional discovery and 
denied the Motion without prejudice. [R. 121-22.] The court further ordered that at the 
end of the 240 day discovery period, Butterfield Ford could renew the Motion and if, at 
that time, Plaintiff failed to controvert the facts established in the Butterfield Affidavit, 
the Motion would be granted. [Id.] 
At the conclusion of the 240 day discovery period and after Plaintiff had taken the 
deposition of Brent E. Butterfield, Butterfield Ford filed a Renewed Motion for Summary 
Judgment (the "Renewed Motion"), together with a memorandum in support thereof. 
The basis of the Renewed Motion was that Plaintiff had failed to discover any facts 
which would controvert the Butterfield Affidavit or which would otherwise support a 
findingof any fault or liability on the part of Butterfield Ford. [R. 171-206.] In response 
to the Renewed Motion, Plaintiff conceded that Butterfield Ford: (i) did not participate in 
the design, manufacture, engineering, testing or assembly of the Van; (ii) did not prepare 
any labeling or instructions associated with the Van; (iii) did not perform any services or 
repairs on the Van; (iv) did not modify or alter the Van in any way; and that (v) the Van 
arrived at Butterfield Ford as a finished product from Ford Motor Company and was 
distributed by Butterfield Ford in the same condition, without repair work, modifications, 
or alterations. [R. 210, 174-75.] 
In his deposition, Brent Butterfield testified repeatedly when asked whether he 
was aware of the handling and stability characteristics of the Van that he knew that a van 
has a higher center of gravity and will therefore handle differently than a sports car. [R. 
191, 198, 200.] Rather than dispute the facts established by Butterfield Ford in the 
Butterfield Affidavit and Mr. Butterfield's deposition, Plaintiff argued that Butterfield 
Ford's knowledge that a van has a higher center of gravity than a sports car created a duty 
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on the part of Butterfield Ford to warn purchasers of the Van of handling "problems." 
[R. 210, 215.] 
C. Disposition of the Court Below 
On June 2, 2003, the trial court granted the Renewed Motion and dismissed 
Plaintiffs claims against Butterfield Ford, finding that: (i) "Plaintiff failed to present any 
credible evidence to show that Butterfield Ford was anything but a passive distributor" of 
the Van; (ii) "Butterfield Ford did not design, manufacture, test, assemble, package or 
ship the vehicle. It did not modify, alter or change the vehicle in any manner"; (iii) the 
fact that Butterfield Ford acknowledged that a van has a higher center of gravity than a 
sports car does not create a genuine issue of material fact that the dealer knew of any 
design defects in the Van; and (iv) the "Utah Liability Reform Act does not provide a 
cause of action for strict liability against a purely passive distributor where the fault 
complained of arises out of a design or manufacturing defect, and where the 
manufacturer/designer of the product is a named party in the action." [R. 327-28.] 
Plaintiffs claims against Ford Motor Company, the designer and manufacturer of 
the Van, are still pending. Those claims have been removed to the United States District 
Court for the District of Utah, Case No. 2:03-CV-00512,1 where Plaintiff has filed a 
motion to remand the claims back to the Third District Court for Salt Lake County, Utah 
due to this pending appeal. [R. 321-25.] 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about December 7, 2000, Plaintiff was a passenger with ten other occupants 
in a 1999 Ford Econoline E-350 Super Club Wagon passenger van (the "Van") which 
was designed and manufactured by the Defendant Ford Motor Company. [R. 3.] 
Plaintiff alleges that near American Fork, Utah, the Van went out of control and rolled 
1
 Ford Motor Company intends to have the case consolidated with two other cases that 
are also pending before the United States District Court for the District of Utah involving 
the same accident that were filed by other passengers in the Van. 
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over multiple times, thereby causing him serious injuries. [R. 3.] The Van was sold by 
Appellee Butterfield Ford in a fleet sale to the Utah Department of Corrections. [R. 44.] 
Plaintiff brought causes of action for strict products liability, breach of warranty, 
and negligence against Defendants Ford Motor Company and Butterfield Ford. [R. 1-7.] 
Plaintiff alleges that the Van was defective and unreasonably dangerous, in that: (a) the 
van has stability problems when loaded with more than ten passengers; (b) the van is 
susceptible to rollovers when loaded with more than ten passengers; (c) driver control 
difficulties exist when the van is loaded with more than ten passengers; (d) the van has 
suspension problems when loaded with more than ten passengers; (e) the van has rollover 
resistance problems when loaded with more than ten passengers; (f) handling difficulties 
exist when the van is loaded with more than ten passengers; (g) the van lacks proper 
passenger compartment protection; and (h) the van lacks adequate warnings related to the 
above alleged defects. [R. 4-5.] Plaintiff also alleges that "Ford Motor Company and/or 
Butterfield Ford" negligently disseminated information or negligently failed to 
disseminate information regarding the van's alleged defects. [R. 6.] 
Butterfield Ford did not participate in the design, manufacture, engineering, 
testing or assembly of the Van. [R. 44.] Butterfield Ford did not prepare any labeling or 
instructions associated with the Van. [R. 44.] Other than a simple inspection of the 
vehicle known as a Pre-Delivery Inspection, Butterfield Ford never performed any 
services or repairs on the Van. [R. 44.] Butterfield Ford never modified or altered the 
Van in any way, and never performed any type of services, repairs, modifications, or 
alterations to the suspension system, occupant compartment system, or other component 
parts of the Van that Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint were negligently designed and/or 
manufactured. [R. 44-45.] 
Butterfield Ford had no knowledge regarding any product defects alleged in this 
case and in fact denies that such defects even exist. Specifically, Mr. Butterfield testified 
that: (i) from the time Butterfield Ford began selling the Econoline product line, it was 
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never provided any information regarding the stability characteristics of the product [R. 
190-91 r ; (ii) Butterfield Ford was never provided with any information regarding 
rollover incidents relating to the Econoline product line [R. 200, 202.]; (iii) Butterfield 
Ford does not receive information regarding the crash worthiness of the vehicles it sells 
[R. 199.]; and (iv) Ford Motor Company personnel have never visited Butterfield Ford to 
discuss safety concerns regarding any vehicles sold by Butterfield Ford [R. 203.] The 
only caution the dealership has been instructed to give to customers, retail or fleet, is that 
the E-350 Econoline van may not be sold for use as a school bus. The reason for this 
prohibition is that the vehicle is not equipped with the NHTSA required arm on the side 
of the vehicle which signals right and left turn, is not painted chromatic yellow and does 
not have reflective tape and front and rear flashers which are required on school buses. 
The prohibition has nothing to do with the alleged defects in this case. [R. 193-96.] 
When Butterfield Ford receives a vehicle from Ford Motor Company, it also receives a 
delivery checklist which contains information about the vehicle. Nothing in the delivery 
checklist for the Van in question contained anything about the handling or stability 
characteristics of the vehicle. [R. 201.] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly found that Plaintiff failed to bring forward any facts 
which could create a legal duty or support a finding of fault on the part of Butterfield 
Ford under the Act.3 Butterfield Ford properly established, through affidavit and 
deposition testimony, that it was nothing more than a passive distributor of a product that 
Mr. Butterfield testified that the only information he received about the steering 
characteristics was provided within the owner's manual of the vehicle and on the visor 
which essentially caution the owner that the van is a van, not a sports car. [R. 191.] 
3
 Plaintiff failed to raise any facts or legal argument in his brief challenging the dismissal 
of his claim for breach of warranties against Butterfield Ford. As such, he has waived 
any claim of error in the trial court's dismissal of that claim. See American Towers 
Owners Ass'n. v. CCI Mechanical Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1185 n.5 (Utah 1996) ("Issues 
not briefed by an appellant are deemed waived and abandoned.") 
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was designed, manufactured, tested and assembled by Ford Motor Company. Butterfield 
Ford did not take any part in the design, manufacture, engineering, testing or assembly of 
the Van. Nor did Butterfield Ford prepare any labeling or instructions associated with the 
Van, perform any services or repairs on the Van or modify the Van or its component 
parts in any way. Plaintiff, being unable to refute the above facts, grossly misstates or 
misrepresents the deposition testimony of Mr. Butterfield, as he did in the trial court, in 
an attempt to create an issue of fact. Plaintiff also cites to several letters, memoranda and 
other papers that were not even in existence at the time Butterfield Ford sold the Van to 
the State of Utah. These materials obviously have no relevance to the time period when 
Butterfield Ford sold the Van to the State of Utah. In short, the trial court properly found 
the "facts" raised by Plaintiff to be both immaterial and not credible to show that 
Butterfield Ford was anything more than a passive distributor of the Van. 
Having found that the Plaintiff failed to bring forward any facts to demonstrate 
that Butterfield Ford was more than just a passive distributor of the Van, the trial court 
properly held that the "Utah Liability Reform Act does not provide a cause of action for 
strict liability against a purely passive distributor where the fault complained of arises out 
of a design or manufacturing defect, and where the manufacturer/designer of the product 
is a named party to the action." The Act was enacted as part of a nationwide tort reform 
movement for the purpose of abrogating the unfair, wasteful common law strict products 
liability actions which allowed a nonmanufacturing passive distributor such as Butterfield 
Ford to be held 100% liable for a plaintiffs damages under the doctrine of joint and 
several liability. Traditionally, a nonmanufacturing distributor with zero liability could 
be held 100% liable for a plaintiffs injuries simply for being in the "chain of 
distribution" of the product. The distributor then had to attempt to recoup its damages 
from the manufacturer of the product through a separate indemnification or contribution 
action. Therefore, although a purely passive distributor was often reimbursed for any 
damages it was forced to pay in a strict products liability action from the manufacturer, it 
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was forced to expend a significant amount of time and resources in doing so. 
In order to do away with the inherent unfairness of forcing a party with no liability 
to participate and expend time and resources defending itself in a lawsuit and then 
pursuing another action for indemnification, Utah and numerous other states enacted tort 
reform legislation to address the problems. The Utah Act allows plaintiffs to recover 
from defendants only to the extent of their proportionate share of fault. In other words, if 
a defendant did not engage in any conduct from which a fact finder could apportion any 
fault, that defendant is not liable for any of the plaintiffs damages. Legislatures in Utah 
and the majority of other states recognized the wastefulness and injustice involved in 
allowing a plaintiff to sue and recover from a defendant with no fault. Indeed, both the 
Utah Supreme Court and this Court have explicitly recognized that the Act supersedes the 
unfair common law actions described above by abolishing joint and several liability and 
common law actions for indemnification or contribution. In so doing, the Act also 
necessarily abolished claims against purely passive distributors based on strict products 
liability for design defects where the manufacturer of the allegedly defective product is a 
named, participating defendant in the action. 
Because Butterfield Ford was nothing more than a passive distributor of the Van 
and did not engage in any conduct which would support a finding of fault under the Act, 
the trial court properly dismissed Plaintiffs claims against Butterfield Ford as a matter of 
law where Ford Motor Company is a named, participating defendant in the action. To 
force Butterfield Ford to continue to expend time and resources defending itself in the 
action would contravene the very purpose of the Act and contradict the express language 
of the Act that prevents recovery from a defendant without any fault. 
271081 3 8 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
IN FAVOR OF BUTTERFIELD FORD BECAUSE PLAINTIFF FAILED 
TO BRING FORWARD ANY FACTS SUPPORTING HIS CLAIMS 
AGAINST BUTTERFIELD FORD. 
Even after receiving an additional 240 days to conduct discovery, Plaintiff was 
unable to bring forward any evidence that could create a legal duty or support a finding of 
fault on the part of Butterfield Ford. It is well established in Utah that "when a party 
'fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to 
that party's case ... there can be 'no genuine issue as to any material fact/ since a 
complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case 
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.'" Burns v. Cannondale Bicycle Co., 876 
P.2d 415, 420 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett 477 U.S. 317, 323, 
106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c)); accord, 
Schafirv.Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384, 1391 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). In this case, the Plaintiff 
failed to bring forward any facts which could establish a legal duty or support a finding of 
fault on the part of Butterfield Ford under the Act. 
In the Butterfield Affidavit, Butterfield Ford established that (i) it did not 
participate in the design, manufacture, engineering, testing or assembly of the Van, (ii) it 
did not prepare any warnings, labeling or instructions associated with the Van, and (iii) 
other than a simple pre-delivery inspection of the Van, it never performed any services or 
repairs on the Van. At Plaintiffs request, the trial court granted Plaintiff 240 days to 
conduct discovery to controvert the facts established in the Butterfield Affidavit. During 
that period, Plaintiff conducted a single deposition - that of Brent Butterfield. Mr. 
Butterfield simply confirmed in his deposition what he testified to in his affidavit. 
Therefore, Butterfield Ford filed a renewed motion for summary judgment (the 
"Renewed Motion"). 
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In response to the Renewed Motion, Plaintiff conceded that Butterfield Ford: (i) 
did not participate in the design, manufacture, engineering, testing or assembly of the 
Van; (ii) did not prepare any labeling or instructions associated with the Van; (iii) did not 
perform any services or repairs on the Van; (iv) did not modify or alter the Van in any 
way; and that (v) the Van arrived at Butterfield Ford as a finished product from Ford 
Motor Company and was distributed by Butterfield Ford in the same condition, without 
repair work, modifications, or alterations. [R. 210, 174-75.] 
Rather than explain the facts discovered that support Plaintiffs theories, Plaintiff 
drastically exaggerated and drew completely improper inferences from the facts and 
represented them as "facts." For example, Plaintiff argued that Butterfield Ford was 
aware of handling and stability "problems" with the Van because Mr. Butterfield testified 
that the Van has a higher center of gravity than a sports car. It is basic hornbook law that 
in order to maintain a cause of action for negligence, a plaintiff must establish "a duty of 
reasonable care owed to the plaintiff." Slisze v. Stanley-Bostitch, 979 P.2d 317, 320 
(Utah 1999). "[T]he question of whether a duty exists is a question of law." Id. (citation 
omitted). In a feeble attempt to establish a legal duty, Plaintiff argues that because 
Butterfield Ford was aware of the obvious fact that the Van has a higher center of gravity 
than a sports car, this knowledge somehow transformed Butterfield Ford from a passive 
distributor to an active distributor with a duty to warn purchasers of that obvious fact. 
Plaintiff has failed to cite the Court to a single legal authority which would support 
his position that Butterfield Ford had a duty to warn purchasers that the Van is defective 
because it has a higher center of gravity than a sports car. This is because there is no 
support in the law for such a claim. To the extent that this fact would create a legal duty, 
because the sale of the Van was part of a fleet sale to the State of Utah, a sophisticated 
purchaser, the duty was assumed by the State to warn the actual drivers of the vehicle. 
The trial court properly concluded that "[t]he fact that Butterfield Ford acknowledged a 
van has a higher center of gravity than a sports car and, as such, handles differently, does 
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not create a genuine issue of material fact that the dealer knew or should have known of 
any alleged design defects. It simply means that vans nde higher on the road than sports 
cars." [R. 327.] This Court should affirm that finding. 
The other "facts" relied on by Plaintiff to support his argument that Butterfield 
Ford had a duty to warn purchasers of "safety problems" with the Van consist of certain 
letters, articles and other materials which were not even published until 2001, 2002 and 
2003. [R. 247-77.] Plaintiff implies that these materials - published in 2001, 2002 and 
2003 - somehow created a duty on the part of Butterfield Ford to inform purchasers of 
the contents of the materials when the Van was sold in 1999! Obviously, such an 
argument lacks merit. There cannot be a legal duty imposed on a party to inform third 
parties of information that was not even in existence or available at the time the alleged 
duty arose. 
Although the law requires a trial court deciding a motion for summary judgment to 
view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, "[i]t does not require 
unreasonable factual inferences, nor does it require that the court turn a blind eye to 
reasonable inferences based on uncontested facts." Surety Underwriters v. E & C 
Trucking, Inc., 2000 UT 71, t 37, 10 P.3d 338. In this case, the trial court properly 
viewed all facts and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in a light most 
favorable to Plaintiff and found there to be no genuine issue of material fact that would 
preclude entry of summary judgment in favor of Butterfield Ford as a matter of law. 
II. BECAUSE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PRESENT ANY FACTS TO 
SUPPORT A FINDING OF FAULT UNDER THE LIABILITY REFORM 
ACT, THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED PLAINTIFF'S 
CLAIMS AGAINST BUTTERFIELD FORD. 
There being no genuine issue of fact, the issue before this Court is whether the 
trial court properly applied the undisputed facts to the law. The Utah Supreme Court has 
recently held that "[t]he application of the [Liability Reform Act] in apportioning fault is 
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a legal question of statutory construction." Bishop v. Gentec, Inc., 2002 UT 36, *f 8, 43 
P.3d 218. Because the material facts are not in dispute, the issue before the Court is 
purely a question of the legal construction of the Act and was appropriately determined 
on summary judgment. 
The Act provides that "[n]o defendant is liable to any person seeking recovery for 
any amount in excess of the proportion of fault attributed to that defendant...." UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78-27-38(3). "Fault" is defined under the Act as "any actionable breach of 
legal duty, act, or omission proximately causing or contributing to injury or damages 
sustained by a person seeking recovery, including negligence ..., comparative 
negligence, assumption of risk, strict liability, breach of express or implied warranty of a 
product, products liability, and misuse, modification, or abuse of a product." Id. § 78-27-
37(2). Therefore, unless a plaintiff is able to demonstrate some breach of legal duty, act, 
or omission by a defendant that proximately caused or contributed to the injury or 
damages complained of, there can be no recovery from that defendant under the Act. 
Plaintiff argues that because the definition of "fault" includes "strict liability" and 
"products liability," then any defendant in a strict products liability action is at "fault" 
under the Act. Indeed, Plaintiff alleges that simply because he has asserted claims 
against Butterfield Ford sounding in strict products liability and such claims are 
encompassed within the Act's definition of "fault," Butterfield Ford is at fault under the 
Act. [Brief of Appellant at 13.] However, the inclusion of the phrases "strict liability," 
"products liability" and others in the definition of fault simply illustrates the Act's 
requirement that fault be apportioned in those circumstances, not that fault means 
"negligence ..., comparative negligence, strict liability, breach of express or implied 
warranty of a product, products liability, and misuse, modification, or abuse of a 
product." Rather, the definition of fault under the Act clearly requires some "breach of 
legal duty, act, or omission proximately causing or contributing to injury or damages." 
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As demonstrated below, Plaintiffs strained interpretation of the Act contravenes 
the express language and purpose of the Act and renders the Act meaningless. Plaintiffs 
interpretation also contradicts the Utah appellate court decisions interpreting and 
applying the Act. The only legal authorities Plaintiff is able to muster in support of his 
position are based on doctrines and theories that have been expressly abolished in Utah. 
A, Traditional products liability actions - joint and several liability and 
actions for contribution or indemnification. 
As correctly pointed out by the Plaintiff, prior to the adoption of the Act in 1986, 
Utah courts had adopted and applied the doctrine set forth in the Second Restatement of 
Torts, Section 402A, which provides that a party who sells a product in a defective, 
unreasonably dangerous condition to the user or consumer is subject to liability for 
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer if (i) the seller is engaged 
in the business of selling the product, and (ii) the product is expected to and does reach 
the user or consumer without substantial change. See Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco 
Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152, 158 (Utah 1979).4 Under Utah law prior to passage of the Act, 
multiple tortfeasors were jointly and severally liable for all damages caused by a 
defective product. See e.g., Cruz v. Montoya, 660 P.2d 723, 728 (Utah 1983). As such, 
"a tortfeasor was potentially liable for the entire amount of a plaintiff s damages, 
irrespective of what proportion of fault was actually attributable to that individual 
tortfeasor as opposed to another joint tortfeasor." National Svc. Indus., Inc. v. B.W. 
Norton Mfg. Co., Inc.. 937 P.2d 551, 554 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citing Brunver v. Salt 
Lake County, 551 P.2d 521, 523-24 (Utah 1976) (Ellet, J., dissenting); W. PAGEKEETON 
ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 50, at 336-38 (1984)). 
In an effort to ameliorate the harshness of the common law rule of joint and 
several liability, Utah adopted the Utah Comparative Negligence Act in 1973. See UTAH 
What Plaintiff failed to address in his brief is the effect of the Act on this doctrine. That 
subject is discussed at length below. See infra, Section II.D.2. 
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CODE ANN. §§ 78-27-37 through 78-27-43 (1973), repealed by Liability Reform Act of 
1986; see also Brad C. Betebenner, The Liability Reform Act: An Approach to Equitable 
Application, 13 J. Contemp. L. 89, 91-92 (1987). The Comparative Negligence Act 
created a new cause of action for contribution, which allowed a tortfeasor forced to pay 
damages greater than its proportion of fault to recover from other joint tortfeasors in a 
separate action. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-39 (1973), repealed by Liability Reform 
Act of 1986. At common law, a defendant held jointly and severally liable for a 
plaintiffs damages who had no fault could also pursue a separate action for 
indemnification against other tortfeasors. See National Svc. Indus., Inc., 937 P.2d at 554 
(citations omitted). Traditionally, an action for indemnification involved full 
reimbursement whereas an action for contribution involved splitting damages among 
joint tortfeasors. See id. (citing RESTATEMENT 2D TORTS § 886B, cmt. a (1977)). The 
common purpose behind contribution and indemnity principles is that they attempted to 
"ensure that parties are not held unfairly liable to an extent greater than their degree of 
fault. Because tortfeasors were jointly and severally liable, joint tortfeasors could 
achieve fair distribution of loss, in many cases, only through separate suits among 
themselves...." Id. 
The rationale behind joint and several liability was that, as between an innocent 
plaintiff and a jointly liable tortfeasor, either the jointly liable tortfeasor should be 
responsible for joining other fellow tortfeasors, or alternatively, the jointly liable 
tortfeasor should seek contribution or indemnity in a separate action. See Betebenner, 
supra, at 94-95. However, as discussed more fully below, applying the doctrine of joint 
and several liability in products liability actions based on strict liability caused plaintiffs 
to abuse the system and were inherently unfair, causing the majority of states in the 
country to significantly modify their approach to tort litigation. 
5
 In fact, Utah has completely abolished the doctrine of joint and several liability and 
eliminated separate actions for contribution or indemnification. See infra Section II.D.l. 
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B. The nationwide tort reform movement and enactment of tort reform 
legislation. 
In the mid-1980s, state legislatures across the country, including Utah, recognized 
the inherent unfairness of joint and several liability and the massive costs incurred by 
defendants who had little or no fault which contributed to plaintiffs' damages. See 
Betebenner, supra, at 93 (discussing public concern that defendants with little or no fault 
were being held liable for damages and skyrocketing insurance costs and jury awards); 
Joseph Sanders and Craig Joyce, "Off to the Races ": The 1980s Tort Crisis and the Law 
Reform Process, 27 HOUSTON L. REV. 207, 210-11 (1990) (explaining joint and several 
liability caused drastic increases in cost of insurance as a result of companies with little 
or no fault being held jointly and severally liable for large damages awards.) The 
unfairness and escalating insurance and other costs associated with the doctrine of joint 
and several liability caused legislatures throughout the country, including Utah, to enact 
tort reform legislation to address these problems. 
Between 1985 and 1988, forty-eight states adopted varying forms of tort reform 
legislation to mitigate the unfairness of joint and several liability and the skyrocketing 
costs and jury awards against parties with little or no fault. See Sanders et al., supra, at 
210 n. 13, 220-22. The common thread among the varying tort reform statutes is their 
purpose to limit or completely abolish the harsh effects of joint and several liability. See 
Mike Steenson, Recent Legislative Responses to the Rule of Joint and Several Liability, 
23 Tort & Ins. L.J. 482, 483 (1998) ("The justifications that have been advanced for the 
reformation of joint and several liability have been based in part on the insurance crisis 
and in part on what is perceived to be the inherent unfairness of the rule of joint and 
several liability.") Thirty of the forty-eight states enacting tort reform legislation either 
limited or completely abolished joint and several liability. See Sanders et al., supra, at 
220-22. 
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Numerous legislatures around the country recognized the inequitable, callous 
effects of joint and SCA eral liability in actions holding passive distributors of products 
strictly liable for harm caused by those products when the distributors had no 
involvement in the design or manufacture of the products. In fact, many states enacted 
legislation expressly prohibiting products liability actions based on the doctrine of strict 
liability against a seller of a product unless the seller is also the manufacturer, or 
participated in the manufacture, of the product. See e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-11.1; 
IND. CODE ANN. § 34-20-2-3; NEB. REV. ST. § 25-21,181; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 
20-9-9. Several other states have expressly barred products liability actions based on 
strict liability against nonmanufacturing sellers of products unless the manufacturer of the 
product is insolvent or not subject to the jurisdiction of the respective court. See e.g., 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 7001; IDAHO CODE § [6-1407] 6-1307; 735 I I I . COMP STAT. 
ANN. 5/2-621; IOWA CODE § 613.18; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3306; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 411.340; MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-405; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 544.41; Mo. ANN. 
STAT. § 537.762; N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 99B-2; N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.3-04; OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.78; TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-106; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 
7.72.040. The rationale and basis for immunizing nonmanufacturing sellers from liability 
in strict products liability actions is that 
"... bringing nonmanufacturing sellers or distributors into products liability 
litigation generates wasteful legal costs. Although liability in most cases is 
ultimately passed on to the manufacturer who is responsible for creating the 
product defect, nonmanufacturing sellers or distributors must devote resources to 
protect their interests. [Ijmmunizing nonmanufacturers from strict liability saves 
those resources without jeopardizing the plaintiffs interests." 
RESTATEMENT 3RD TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1, cmt. e (1998). 
Therefore, it is clear that, in addition to the general inherent unfairness of joint and 
several liability, legislatures across the country were concerned specifically with the 
problem of holding nonmanufacturing, passive distributors such as Butterfield Ford 
strictly liable for product defects. As demonstrated below, Utah, like the other states 
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adopting comparative fault legislation, chose to address this problem indirectly by 
prohibiting recovery from any defendant in excess of that defendant's proportionate share 
of fault. 
C. Enactment of the Utah Liability Reform Act. 
As part of the nationwide tort reform movement in the mid-1980s, Utah adopted 
the Utah Liability Reform Act in 1986, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-27-37 through 78-27-43. 
The Act provides that "[n]o defendant is liable to any person seeking recovery for any 
amount in excess of the proportion of fault attributed to that defendant under Section 78-
27-39." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-38(3). Section 78-27-39 requires that the trial court 
direct the jury to find separate special verdicts determining the total amount of damages 
and the percentage or proportion of fault attributable to each plaintiff, each defendant and 
any other person who contributed to the alleged injury, including persons immune from 
suit. See id- § 78-27-39(1). Section 78-27-40 again provides that the "maximum amount 
for which any defendant may be liable to any person seeking recovery is that percentage 
or proportion of the damages equivalent to the percentage or proportion of fault attributed 
to that defendant." Id. § 78-27-40(1). As noted above, "fault" is defined under the Act as 
"any actionable breach of legal duty, act, or omission proximately causing or contributing 
to injury or damages sustained by a person seeking recovery, including negligence ..., 
comparative negligence, assumption of risk, strict liability, breach of express or implied 
warranty of a product, products liability, and misuse, modification, or abuse of a 
product." Id. § 78-27-37(2). 
The purpose of the Act, as stated by the legislature, was to ensure that no 
defendant pay any more than its "fair share" of damages. Minutes, Utah Senate, State 
and Local Standing Committee, 46th Leg., 1986 General Sess. (Jan. 27, 1986); Floor 
Debate, Utah House of Representatives, 46th Leg., 1986 General Sess., Records 17 & 18 
(Feb. 26, 1986). As one senator observed, "it is the basic fairness concept we're driving 
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at. The defendant ought to be on the hook only for its own percentage of damages, but 
ought not be the guarantor for everyone else's damages.'' Floor Debate, Utah Senate, 
46th Leg. 1986, General Sess., Records No. 63 (Feb. 12, 1986) (emphasis added). It is 
clear from the legislative history of the Act that it was aimed at preventing the same harsh 
and unfair effects of joint and several liability discussed above that other tort reform 
legislation was aimed to mitigate. In fact, each preliminary draft of the Act stated in the 
title that the purpose of the Act was, among other things, "abolishing joint and several 
liability." 
D. The Act abolished joint and several tort liability and separate actions 
for contribution and indemnification and precludes recovery from any 
party without any fault. 
Plaintiff argued before the trial court, and continues to argue in his brief before 
this Court, that the traditional principles in strict products liability litigation discussed 
above, supra Section II. A. (i.e., joint and several liability, strict liability of distributors of 
defective products, and contribution or indemnification), are still viable in Utah 
notwithstanding the State's adoption of the Act. [Brief of Appellant at 14-20.] Plaintiffs 
continued reliance on case law decided well before enactment of the Act is astonishing 
and does nothing to aid this Court in applying the Act to the undisputed facts of this case. 
Plaintiff fails to connect the dots and explain the current status of the law in Utah after 
adoption of the Act. 
1. Effect of the Act on the doctrine of joint and several liability and 
separate actions for contribution and indemnification. 
In support of his position that a purely passive distributor of a defective product 
may be held liable under the Act under the doctrine of strict liability, Plaintiff states that 
"other authorities that have considered the issue have concluded that the liability of a 
passive retailer in a case like this is a form of vicarious liability and that the retailer and 
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manufacturer should therefore be treated as a single unit for apportionment of fault; to the 
extent the retailer is held liable for the harm caused by the defective product, it may have 
a claim for indemnity against the manufacturer." [Brief of Appellant at 18 (emphasis 
added) (citations omitted).] The only Utah case relied on by Plaintiff for this proposition 
is Hanover Ltd. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 758 P.2d 443, 447 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) which 
Plaintiff concedes was "decided under the law as it existed before passage of the Liability 
Reform Act." [Id. at 19.] Plaintiff also argues that "[s]trict products liability is a joint 
tort in the original sense of the word" and that joint tortfeasors "could all be liable for all 
of the plaintiffs injuries, under the theory that the act of one was the act of all." [Id.] 
Plaintiffs arguments and his continued reliance on the authorities cited demonstrates 
Plaintiffs misunderstanding of the Act and its effect on traditional common law products 
liability doctrines. 
Plaintiffs statement that a manufacturer and a retailer "should be treated as a 
single unit for apportionment of fault" and his reliance on the doctrine of joint and 
several liability flies in the face of the express language of the Act and Utah appellate 
decisions interpreting the Act. Plaintiff essentially argues that a seller and a manufacturer 
of a product are jointly and severally liable for damages caused by defects in the product. 
This is the very evil that the Act was intended to avoid! Indeed, both this Court and the 
Utah Supreme Court have held that the Act "abolished joint and several liability by 
providing that '[n]o defendant is liable to any person seeking recovery for any amount in 
excess of the proportion of fault attributed to that defendant.'" National Svc. Indus., Inc., 
937 P.2d at 554-55 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-38 (1996)); see also Sullivan v. 
Scoular Grain Co. of Utah, 853 P.2d 877, 882 (Utah 1993). Therefore, to the extent 
Plaintiffs claims against Butterfield Ford are based on the doctrine of joint and several 
liability, they fail as a matter of law. 
As a further justification for holding a purely passive distributor strictly liable 
under the Act, Plaintiff argues that a nonmanufacturing seller that is held liable for 
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product defects can simply file an action for indemnity against the manufacturer. This 
argument is also contrary to the express language of the Act and established Utah law 
applying the Act. The Act expressly states that "[a] defendant is not entitled to 
contribution from any other person." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-40(2). As this Court has 
recognized, this provision makes sense because "with the abrogation of joint and several 
liability, there remains no need for suits to redistribute loss among joint tortfeasors 
because no party will in any case be liable for more than its degree of fault in the 
underlying tort action." National Svc. Indus., Inc., 937 P.2d at 555. The Court went on 
to hold that the Act necessarily "prohibits] any action separate from the underlying tort 
action which seeks to redistribute loss based on degree of fault," including actions for 
indemnification, and barred the plaintiffs indemnification claim. Id. at 555-56. 
Therefore, Plaintiffs reliance on the doctrines of contribution and/or indemnification in 
support of his claims also fails. 
2. Effect of the Act on Restatement Second of Torts § 402A. 
Plaintiff also continues to rely on the doctrine set forth in the Second Restatement 
of Torts, Section 402 A which provides that a nonmanufacturing seller of a defective 
product may be held strictly liable for harm caused by the product. However, Plaintiff 
again fails to explain what effect the Act has had on that doctrine in Utah and continues 
to rely on case law applying the doctrine decided well before adoption of the Act. A 
careful review of the Act and its purposes demonstrates clearly that the traditional 
common law strict products liability of passive distributors of defective products set forth 
in Section 402 A of the Second Restatement is no longer good law in Utah. Instead, Utah 
law now requires apportionment of fault among all parties and expressly prohibits 
liability in excess of the parties' proportionate share of fault. As correctly stated by 
Plaintiff in his brief, the rationale behind Section 402 A is that "as between an innocent 
user of the product and the person who sold the product, the one who should bear the loss 
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is the one who created the danger by placing the product on the market...." [Brief of 
Appellant at 15 (citing Restatement 2d Torts § 402A, cmt. c and f; Ernest W. Hahn, Inc., 
601 P.2d at 156-57; Hanover v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 758 P.2d 443, 445 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988)).] This is the same policy underlying the doctrine of joint and several liability, 
which has been abolished by the Act. The Utah Legislature and other legislatures across 
the country made a conscious and intentional decision to shift the burdens involved in 
products liability litigation by requiring plaintiffs to locate and join all potentially liable 
tortfeasors at the initiation of the action and to prevent defendants from being liable for 
any more than their "fair share" of the plaintiffs damages. 
The new Restatement acknowledges the questionable application of Section 402 A 
in jurisdictions that have enacted tort reform legislation abolishing joint and several 
liability, stating that such legislation "to some extent, immunizes nonmanufacturing 
sellers or distributors from strict liability." RESTATEMENT 3RD TORTS: PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY § 1, cmt. e (1998). Other commentators have also recognized the questionable 
application of Section 402A in jurisdictions that have enacted comparative fault 
legislation. See e,g., 6 STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 
18:124 at 79 (1989) (acknowledging that there is "some question as to the product 
liability of nonmanufacturing sellers ... in light of limiting legislation.") In light of (i) 
the express language of the act prohibiting a defendant from being held liable for any 
damages in excess of its proportionate share of fault, (ii) the purpose of the Act to 
eliminate the very unfairness created by Section 402A, and (iii) the abolishment of joint 
and several liability and separate actions for contribution or indemnification, the 
principles set forth in Section 402A cannot be reconciled with the Act. 
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E. Under the Act, there can be no liability against a purely passive 
distributor absent a showing of fault which caused or contributed to 
the plaintiffs injuries. 
As demonstrated above and before the trial court, the material facts are not 
disputed. Butterfield Ford did not (i) participate in the design, manufacture, engineering, 
testing or assembly of the Van; (ii) prepare any labeling or instructions associated with 
the Van; (iii) perform any services or repairs on the Van; or (iv) modify or alter the Van 
in any way. Moreover, the Van arrived at Butterfield Ford as a finished product from 
Ford Motor Company and was distributed by Butterfield Ford in the same condition, 
without repair work, modifications, or alterations. The only issue before the trial court 
and this Court is one of law. That issue is, given the above undisputed facts, whether 
Butterfield Ford engaged in any conduct which would support a finding of fault on the 
part of Butterfield Ford under the Act. For the same reasons that many jurisdictions have 
expressly prohibited products liability actions based on strict liability against 
nonmanufacturing defendants through legislation, and the reasons that allowed passive, 
nonmanufacturing distributors to obtain full indemnity from manufacturers under 
traditional common law principles, there can be no liability on the part of Butterfield 
Ford under the Act. 
Those courts that have addressed the issue in states that have abolished or limited 
joint and several liability have held that a purely passive distributor of an allegedly 
defective product cannot be liable for harm caused by the product absent a showing that 
the seller somehow participated in the manufacture of the product. See ej*., In re 
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Products Liability Litigation, 204 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 
1152 (S.D. Ind. 2002); Matthews v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 708 So.2d 1248, 1249 (La. Ct. 
App. 1998); Schneider v. Tri Star International Inc., 476 S.E.2d 846, 848 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1996); Alltrade, Inc. v. McDonald, 445 S.E.2d 856, 858 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994); Mask v. 
Chrysler Corp., 825 F. Supp. 285, 288-89 (N.D. Ala. 1993); Zehner v. Nordskog Indus., 
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Inc., 1992 U.S. Dist. Lexis 13382, 8-12 (E.D. La. 1992); Liesener v. Weslo, Inc., 775 F. 
Supp. 857, 859 (D. Md. 1991); Funk v. Wagner Machinery, Inc., 710 S.W.2d 860, 862 
(Ky. Ct. App. 1986). Unlike the cases cited by Plaintiff which are premised on the 
traditional products liability theories which have now been expressly abolished in Utah, 
the above cases are premised on the purposes of the tort reform legislation discussed 
above - namely, to eliminate the harsh, inequitable results of joint and several liability 
and the wasteful legal costs of forcing a party with no fault to nevertheless compensate 
the plaintiff for damages. To hold otherwise would thwart the very purposes of the Act 
and be contrary to the express language of the Act and the established Utah law 
interpreting the Act. 
The Utah cases cited by Plaintiff in his brief which were decided after passage of 
the Act are, unfortunately, not helpful in deciding the issue before the Court. The simple 
fact is that the issue presented is one of first impression that has not been decided by a 
Utah appellate court. For example, Plaintiff cites this Court's opinion in House v. 
Armour of America, Inc., 886 P.2d 542 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) for the proposition that 
"Utah appellate courts have continued to recognize that non-manufacturing sellers of 
products are potentially liable for claims sounding in products liability, even after 
enactment of the Liability Reform Act." [Brief of Appellant at 16.] However, a closer 
look at the House decision reveals that it does not deal with a "non-manufacturing seller 
of a product" as Plaintiff alleges. Rather, in House, the trial court granted summary 
judgment in favor of defendants that were in the business of "designing, manufacturing, 
testing and selling bullet-resistant vests." Id. at 545. This Court reversed the summary 
judgment entered in favor of the defendants on the grounds that there were issues of fact 
regarding whether the defendants had a duty to warn the plaintiff and whether defendants 
had satisfied that duty through the warning they placed on the subject vest. See id- at 
549-51. 
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The defendants in House were not passive at all and their participation in the 
manufacture, design and labeling of the product in question precluded the entry of 
summary judgment in their favor. In contrast, there is no dispute that Butterfield Ford 
played no part in the design, manufacture, testing, engineering or labeling of the Van in 
question. As the trial court found, Plaintiff failed to bring forward any facts to show that 
Butterfield Ford was anything more than a passive distributor of the Van. 
The dictum quoted by Plaintiff in Jackson v. Phillip Morris Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 
1217, 1229 (D. Utah 1998) is likewise not helpful in supporting Plaintiffs position. In 
fact, Jackson directly supports Butterfield Ford's position that Plaintiffs claims are 
unsupported in law and were brought for the sole purpose of destroying diversity 
jurisdiction and preventing Ford Motor Company from removing the case to federal 
court. The court in Jackson held that the plaintiffs "failed to show any sufficient basis for 
bringing a strict products liability claim against" in-state distributors of cigarettes. Id. at 
1228. The court further denied the plaintiffs' motion to remand the case back to state 
court after removal and held that the in-state distributors had been fraudulently joined. 
See id. at 1230. 
The Hanover case, although decided by this Court in 1988 applying the law in 
effect prior to enactment of the Act, does provide some guidance on the issue presented 
in this Case. In Hanover, a retail seller of an allegedly defective product brought an 
indemnification claim for attorneys fees, costs and expenses against the manufacturer of 
the product which were incurred in defending a product liability action. See 758 P.2d at 
443. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the manufacturer and against 
the nonmanufacturing seller. See id. at 445. This Court reversed the trial court, holding 
that a passive seller is entitled to be fully indemnified by the product manufacturer for 
attorney fees, costs and expenses incurred in defending a product liability action alleging 
defective product, regardless of whether a judgment was entered against the seller. See 
id. at 450. This right to indemnification only existed to the extent the non-manufacturing 
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seller did not engage in any culpable conduct of its own. See id. at 448. In other words, 
to the extent the passive seller did not engage in any culpable conduct (i.e., was not at 
"fault"), it was entitled to full indemnification from the manufacturer. 
The Hanover case is instructive to this case even though it did not apply the Act 
because it demonstrates that, even prior to enactment of the Act, passive sellers of 
defective products were "prevented from being derivatively or vicariously liable for the 
wrongful act of the manufacturer" under the doctrine of indemnification. Id. at 446. For 
the same reasons that a passive seller was entitled to complete indemnification from a 
manufacturer of an allegedly defective product unless the seller engaged in some culpable 
conduct, a purely passive seller that has not engaged in any culpable conduct may not be 
held liable for damages under the Act. Prior to enactment of the Act, a passive non-
manufacturing seller had to pursue a separate action for indemnification for such a 
determination. Now, no such action is allowed, nor is it necessary, because a purely 
passive, nonmanufacturing seller of an allegedly defective product cannot be apportioned 
any fault for harm caused by the defect under the Act. 
As noted above, Plaintiff maintains that because the definition of "fault" under the 
Act includes the phrases "strict liability" and "products liability," Butterfield Ford may 
be held strictly liable for defects in the Van. What Plaintiff is essentially arguing is that 
all defendants along the chain of distribution of a defective product are jointly and 
severally liable to the Plaintiff for damages. If the Court were to adopt Plaintiffs 
interpretation of the meaning of "fault," the Act and its purposes would be rendered 
meaningless. The harsh, unfair results of joint and several liability which the Act was 
intended to abolish, and in fact did abolish, would continue in Utah despite the 
legislature's express desire to eradicate them. 
Plaintiffs definition of fault begs the question of what constitutes fault and simply 
returns the status of the law in Utah to the period prior to enactment of the Act as if the 
Act had no effect on traditional products liability litigation. If fault is equated with "strict 
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liability" or "products liability," Plaintiff provides no explanation of how fault could be 
apportioned among several defendants along the chain of distribution. The Act and its 
purposes clearly contemplate some form of culpable conduct on the part of a defendant. 
"Fault" means a "breach of legal duty, act, or omission proximately causing or 
contributing to injury or damages ...." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37(2). It requires 
some "breach," "act" or "omission." The Act's prohibition against holding a defendant 
liable for any amount in excess of the proportion of fault attributed to the defendant 
would be meaningless if sellers and manufacturers are "treated as a single unit" for 
apportionment of fault as Plaintiff alleges they should be. In so arguing, Plaintiff 
implicitly concedes that Butterfield Ford has no fault on its own part but only if 
considered as a single unit with Ford Motor Company. As noted above, this is called 
joint and several liability and has been abolished by the Act. 
This is not to say that sellers or distributors of products can never be at fault under 
the Act for damages caused by the products they sell or distribute. If a seller or 
distributor of a product breaches some duty or engages in some culpable conduct which 
contributed to the plaintiffs injuries, the seller or distributor could potentially be at fault 
under the Act. However, where there is no evidence of any breach of legal duty or 
culpable act or omission on the part of a seller or distributor, the Act does not support a 
claim against such a defendant. 
Utah has long recognized - traditionally through the right to indemnification, and 
now through principles of comparative fault - that the liability for harm caused by 
defective products rests squarely on the shoulders of the manufacturers of those products. 
In this case, Plaintiffs claims against Ford Motor Company, the manufacturer of the Van 
are still alive and pending. As such, to allow Plaintiffs claims to proceed against 
Butterfield Ford absent some showing of fault would be wasteful, unfair, and would 
violate the Act and further the evils that the Act was intended to prevent. 
Although the issues presented in this appeal are complex legal issues, the reason 
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they are before this Court is not because Plaintiff hopes to recover damages from 
Butterfield Ford. Plaintiff has no such intention. Rather, Plaintiffs sole purpose for 
filing claims against Butterfield Ford is to destroy diversity jurisdiction and prevent Ford 
Motor Company from removing the case to federal court. Notwithstanding Plaintiffs 
desire to have his claims heard in state court, his tactics promote the wasteful legal costs 
and unfair results which the Act was intended to prevent. Butterfield Ford was entitled to 
dismissal of the claims against it because Plaintiff failed to bring forward any facts which 
would support the claims. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court properly found that there were no genuine issues of material fact 
which would preclude entry of judgment as a matter of law. The trial court also properly 
applied the undisputed facts to the law in dismissing Plaintiffs claims against Butterfield 
Ford. Plaintiff failed to bring forward any evidence which would create a legal duty 
which was breached by Butterfield Ford or support a finding of fault against Butterfield 
Ford under the Utah Liability Reform Act. As such, Butterfield Ford respectfully 
requests that this Court uphold the purposes and the legal requirements of the Utah 
Liability Reform Act and affirm the trial court. 
DATED this 12th day of November, 2003. 
Snell & Wilmer L.LP. 
Bryon J. Benevento 
Brian C. Cheney 
Attorneys for Appellee Butterfield Ford 
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Timothy J. Ryan 
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ADDENDUM 
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Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Summary Judgment. 
(b) For Defending Party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is 
asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be 
filed and served in accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought shall be rendered if 
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there 
is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37. Definitions. 
As used in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-43: 
(2) "Fault" means any actionable breach of legal duty, act, or omission proximately 
causing or contributing to injury or damages sustained by a person seeking recovery, 
including negligence in all its degrees, comparative negligence, assumption of risk, strict 
liability, breach of express or implied warranty of a product, products liability, and 
misuse, modification, or abuse of a product. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-38. Comparative negligence. 
(2) A person seeking recovery may recover from any defendant or group of defendants 
whose fault, combined with the fault of persons immune from suit, exceeds the fault of 
the person seeking recovery prior to any reallocation of fault made under Subsection 78-
27-39(2). 
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Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-39. Separate special \erdids on total damages and 
proportion of fault. 
fl) The trial court may, and when requested b> any pdtiy shall, duett thejur), it ath, to 
find separate special verdicts determining the total amount of damages sustained and the 
percentage or proportion of fault attributable to each person seeking recover}, to each 
delcndant, and to any other person whether joined as a part) to the action or not and 
whose identity is known or unknown to the parties to the action, including a person 
immune from suit who contributed to the alleged injury. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-40. Amount of liability limited to proportion of fault —No 
contribution. 
(1) Subject to Section 78-27-38, the maximum amount for which a defendant may be 
liable to any person seeking recovery is that percentage or proportion of the damages 
equivalent to the percentage or proportion of fault attributed to that defendant. 
(2) A defendant is not entitled to contribution from any other person. 
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Bryon J. Benevenlo (5254) 
Brian C.Cheney (8881) 
SNELL & WlLMER L.L.P. 
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Facsimile: (801) 257-1 Si"'• 
Attorneys for Defendants Ford Motor Company and 
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INTHETHIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT (Oi l IM 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, FOR I Ml! SI A I I O i l II \H 
BARRY SANNS, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
i-ORD MOTOR COMPANY, a Delaware 
Corporation; BUTTERFIELD FORD, a 
Utah Corporation; and DOFS T;']?(-!'-' Ji 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING BUTTERFIELD 
FORD'S RENEWED MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No O20904820 
Judt'O Stent Henriod 
Defendant ButtertielJ ; - . i :• • Renewed 
Motion") came before this ( ourt for o;,il argument on May 2c. 2^h)}. The Honorable Mepiicii L. 
I lenr:.--'! pr-•'v!"i : • • u- e-;ted h\ David K Olsen and Pyi.il M Simmons )efendant 
Butterfield ford was represented by Bryon J. dene* . -. • el 
that it had v :\ jotHy granted Plaintiff additional time to conduct discover} m e.ut-i .o appose 
Defentur. . . . ' iur!;m?nMhat was filed on December 
13. 2002. After reviewing the Renewed Motion, the opposing aiu; supper...ig memoiand,i. ili< 
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Affidavit of Brent Butterfield, the deposition testimony and other documentary exhibits, and 
having heard oral argument of counsel, the Court finds as follows: 
Findings 
1. Plaintiff failed to present any credible evidence to show that Butterfield Ford was 
anything but a passive distributor of the vehicle in question. Butterfield Ford did not design, 
manufacture, test, assemble, package or ship the vehicle. It did not modify, alter or change the 
vehicle in any manner. Instead, it simply sold the vehicle to the State of Utah as part of a fleet 
transaction in the same condition as the vehicle was received from Ford Motor Company. 
2. The fact that Butterfield Ford acknowledged a van has a higher center of gravity 
than a sports car and, as such, handles differently, does not create a genuine issue of material fact 
that the dealer knew or should have known of any alleged design defects. It simply means that 
vans ride higher on the road than sports cars. The Court is not persuaded that this fact changes the 
status of Butterfield Ford to something other than a passive distributor of the vehicle. 
3. The Utah Liability Reform Act ("Act") does not provide a cause of action for strict 
liability against a purely passive distributor where the fault complained of arises out of a design or 
manufacturing defect, and where the manufacturer/designer of the product is a named party to the 
action. Under these circumstances no fault can be apportion to the passive distributor since it was 
not involved in the design and manufacture of the product. To hold otherwise would render the 
apportionment of fault a legal fiction since fault presupposes some breach of duty or culpable act 
of commission or omission that cannot exist in a case of a purely passive distributor. It would also 
reinstate the concept of joint and several liability which has been expressly abrogated by the Act. 
Order 
Based upon the forgoing, it is hereby ordered that Defendant Butterfield Ford's Renewed 
Motion is granted, and Plaintiffs claims against Butterfield Ford are dismissed with prejudice. 
The Court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay and therefore directs 
that this order be entered as a final judgment as to defendant Butterfield Ford under Utah Rule of 
im%m\ 36 *\ *V*t 
Civil Procedure 54(b), 
DATED this P day oi Juiu... 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
David R. Olsen 
Paul M. Simmons 
Dewsnup, King & Olsen 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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